This paper challenges the view that bans on kidney sales are unjustifiably paternalistic, that is, that they unduly deny people the freedom to make decisions about their own bodies in order to protect them from harm.
INTRODUCTION
Since the first successful human kidney transplants in the 1950s the procedure has emerged as the treatment of choice for end-stage renal disease. The demand for transplants has increased steadily over the last several decades due to a range of factors, including improved transplantation techniques, better immunosuppression drugs, and an aging population.
However, the number of transplantable kidneys from deceased and living donors has not seen a similar increase. Hence the often described 'kidney shortage'. Patients wait increasingly longer for transplants, relying instead on less effective and more burdensome dialysis treatments (where these are available) and sometimes dying while waiting.
Different measures have been taken or envisaged in order to address the kidney shortage. These include using lower quality cadaver kidneys, moving from explicit to presumed consent to cadaveric donation, and permitting living donation to non-relatives and living undirected donation to strangers. A particularly debated proposal is to attract more living donors by offering payment for kidneys. However, kidney sales are illegal almost everywhere and condemned by powerful international organisations such as the EU and the
UN.
The near universal ban on kidney sales is increasingly criticised in the literature. The most obvious and widely rehearsed criticism appeals to efficiency. Payment would attract more donors, it is argued, thus increasing the number of kidneys available for transplant, potentially saving or improving the lives of patients waiting for them.
1 This is a powerful argument -everyone agrees on the importance of avoiding death and reducing suffering -but it has one notable limitation. The effect of allowing payment on the availability of kidneys is ultimately a complex empirical question. While there are good armchair reasons to think that payment would increase availability (people often do things for money that they would not do for free), one can also think of reasons why it would not. Some opponents of markets in body parts even think that payment may decrease the amount of organs available by discouraging those who would otherwise donate for free. 2 And both sides of the debate can cite empirical evidence to support their case. 
THE ANTI-PATERNALIST ARGUMENT
There is another, more principled argument against banning kidney sales. In liberal societies it is generally assumed that people should be free to live their lives as they wish unless there are good reasons for restricting their freedom. Some reasons for restriction -especially the prevention of harm to third parties -enjoy wide acceptance, while others are more controversial. Champions of liberty are particularly suspicious of limiting people's choices for their own good: in many areas of life there is a presumption against paternalism.
Prohibiting kidney sales seems to sit uneasily with that presumption. Stewart Cameron the real concern is with the person's ignorance rather than with the harm itself, and that no valid reason for interference remains once her ignorance is removed.
CHALLENGING THE ANTI-PATERNALIST ARGUMENT
The structure of the anti-paternalist argument against banning kidney sales was not clear in the earlier quotes, but the above conceptual remarks make possible the following explication:
(i) Bans on kidney sales restrict the liberty of would-be vendors protect them from the risks involved. However, I will accept this premise for the sake of the discussion. I want to convince the anti-paternalist, not convert her. Other things equal, an argument is stronger if it is potentially acceptable to anti-paternalists as well as to others than if it invokes hard paternalism.
One might challenge premise (ii) by pointing towards harms to others than vendors, the prevention of which provides a non-paternalistic rationale for prohibiting sales. But harms to whom? It is unlikely that recipients of transplants would be harmed, at least if permitting sales increased the availability of kidneys. On the contrary, many of them would presumably benefit from a transplant that they would not otherwise get. However, potential recipients would be harmed if permitting sales undermined altruistic donation to the extent that less rather than more kidneys became available, thus decreasing rather than increasing their chances of getting one. Recipients could also be harmed if kidneys obtained through sale were of lower quality than donated kidneys. Perhaps there are also more general harms. Some believe that altruism is a societal good, the erosion of which is bad for everyone. 24 Their argument has wider application since many other countries have similar systems.
25 Another reason for excluding minors as a group from some forms of self-harming behaviour (smoking, drinking) is that such behaviour is more dangerous for them than for
My contention is that a prohibition on kidney sales can in principle be defended on analogous, group soft paternalistic grounds. Because such a defence relies on soft rather than hard paternalism, it is potentially acceptable to anti-paternalists and easier to accept for others as well. More precisely, if (1) kidney sales are potentially harmful to vendors, (2) some vendors are expected not to act autonomously, and (3) it is not feasible to adopt different standards for autonomous and non-autonomous would-be vendors, then there is good reason to deny everybody the opportunity to sell a kidney in order to protect the non-autonomous.
These are three big 'ifs', however, and each needs to be examined separately before it can be determined how convincing the argument is.
GROUP SOFT PATERNALISM AND KIDNEY SALES Harm to vendors
Paternalistic policies seek to promote or protect the welfare of at least some of those whose freedom they restrict. Prohibiting kidney sales would thus not be paternalistic -whether justifiably or unjustifiably so -if vendors faced no risks of harm. Like any other surgery, a nephrectomy does involve risks. However, these risks appear to be rather low in favourable adults. While important, I do not think that is the only reason for distinguishing between the two groups. The risks involved in such behaviour differ considerably also between different groups of adults (men and women, different ethnic and social groups, etc.). Yet society tends to impose the same restrictions on all competent adults with respect to self-harming behaviour, presumably because they are all considered capable of choosing whether the risks are worth taking.
circumstances; a comprehensive and much cited US study indicates a 0.03% mortality rate among living kidney donors.
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Advocates of kidney sales claim that such risks are not sufficiently high to ban sales for paternalistic reasons. They offer two analogies in support of that view. First, people are permitted to take jobs and engage in pastimes with mortality rates similar to or higher than that of a nephrectomy. 27 It seems inconsistent to allow them to pursue these activities for money or pleasure, but not to make the supposedly no more risky choice of parting with a kidney for money. Second, kidney sales would presumably be no riskier than living unpaid kidney donation because payment as such would not add any risk to the procedure. 28 If society permits people to take a certain risk in order to give away a kidney for free, it seems that it cannot consistently deny them to take an equal risk in order to sell it. be permitted if such jobs are permitted. Nor must people be allowed to sell a kidney because they are allowed to give one away for free, even if the risk is no greater. This is because the case for soft paternalistic intervention with harmful behaviour does not primarily hinge on the magnitude of harm avoided, but on whether the harm is autonomously chosen. The aim is to protect individuals from harmful choices that are not truly theirs. So it is not inconsistent to permit people to take hazardous jobs or donate a kidney but deny them the equally risky choice of selling a kidney if the latter choice is more likely to be non-autonomous.
Focus is thus shifted from risks to kidney vendors to the quality of their decision, a question to which I return below. Note first, however, that while less important than often assumed, the magnitude of these risks is not simply irrelevant to my argument. Other things equal, the argument is stronger the higher the risks are. I pointed out earlier that while soft paternalism aims to protect people from harmful choices that are not truly theirs, its justification turns at least to some extent on how harmful these choices are. Moreover, the group soft paternalist argument needs to justify not only denying non-autonomous would-be vendors the opportunity to sell, but also restricting the freedom of other, autonomous people for their sake. And higher rather than lower risks to non-autonomous vendors are more likely to carry that justificatory burden.
A comprehensive assessment of the harmfulness of selling a kidney is too large a task to be undertaken here. Kidney sales and autonomy I have already granted that all or a large majority of kidney sales would probably not be substantially non-autonomous if such sales were to be legalised. However, the group soft paternalist argument rests on the different claim that many sales -a sufficiently large proportion (to be specified below) -would be substantially non-autonomous. The distinction between these two claims is crucial. Proponents of kidney sales sometimes rest content with rejecting the former and stronger claim, but it is the latter and weaker claim that underpins my argument. 35 Is that claim plausible?
Dworkin has observed that 'those who are most likely to wish to sell their organs are those whose financial situation is most desperate', and both proponents and critics of such sales have tended to agree. 36 Moreover, that assumption is supported by empirical evidence.
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Now, I granted earlier that we should not be too quick to assume that the desperately poor cannot autonomously decide whether to sell a kidney. However, desperation hardly makes for ideal decision-making either. Many believe that some capacity and opportunity of weighing risks and benefits are necessary for making autonomous choices. 38 Few perform perfectly in 35 For instance, James Stacey Taylor (op. cit. note 1) argues at length that 'the typical kidney vendor' would not suffer impaired autonomy. This is insufficient to establish his conclusion that respect for autonomy requires that a kidney market be permitted. For, as Taylor grants, there are likely to be 'atypical', non-autonomous vendors as well, and that may be enough for prohibiting kidney sales on group soft paternalist grounds. this area: it is all too easy to discount large long-term risks in favour of small short-term benefits. When and why such mistakes occur is ultimately an empirical question, but it is not far-fetched to think that desperation increases the risk of making them. It seems easier overestimate the value of a sum of money desperately needed and easier to discount long-term risks when one's everyday existence is focused on meeting immediate needs. So insofar as kidney vendors would be recruited from the desperately poor, they would likely be if not incapable to decide for themselves so at least vulnerable to compromised decision-making.
Another and perhaps stronger reason to think that many kidney sales would not be substantially autonomous is that the possibility of such sales creates incentives for coercion and other forms of illegitimate influence on the vendor's decision. It is difficult to see how a person's kidney can be a potential economic asset for her without also being a potential economic asset for other people. Imagine a poor person whose only way of obtaining enough money to pay off a debt or finance a needed medical treatment for a loved one is to sell her kidney.
39 Again, the choice may well be voluntary and indeed rational if the person lacks other means to reach her goals. But creditors and family members may be unwilling to rely on the person's own voluntary choice. They may find that pressuring or coercing her to sell her kidney is a much more effective way of getting what they want. The choice would then obviously not be voluntary, and thus not autonomous. One can imagine an almost endless 39 These are realistic scenarios. 96% of the Indian kidney vendors in the study described earlier reported that they sold a kidney in order to pay off a debt. See Goyal et al., op. cit. note 32. And in a much-discussed case, a Turkish peasant sold his kidney to be able to afford life saving medication for his daughter. See Cameron & Hoffenberg, op. cit. note 1.
variety of such scenarios, and it seems naïve to disregard them when contemplating whether people would sell their kidneys autonomously.
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So there is reason to think that many kidney sales would not be substantially autonomous if such sales were legalised. But just how many sales have to be substantially non-autonomous for the group soft paternalist argument to work? Obviously, the possibility that somebody might take a risk non-autonomously is not sufficient to deny everybody the chance to take that risk. If it were, society could all too easily introduce blanket prohibitions on most kinds of hazardous behaviour. Few would accept, say, completely banning salty foods because a small minority are unaware of the dangers of overconsumption and unreceptive to information campaigns. As Miller and Wertheimer note, the proportion of substantially non-autonomous decision-makers must be sufficiently large if group soft paternalism is to be justified.
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I think that the notion of a sufficiently large proportion can be specified -not in exact numbers, but at least in a non-arbitrary way. First, considerations of harm like those explored earlier appear relevant: the more dangerous a choice is, the smaller the proportion of non-autonomous decision-makers needed to deny everyone that choice. 42 Also, what counts 40 Kidney sales advocates typically do not address such scenarios, which is a bit surprising in view of the evidence that they in fact occur in the black Indian kidney market. See Goyal et al., op. cit. note 32. Taylor (op. cit. note 1) does address the issue, admitting that some vendors would probably be coerced, but arguing that this does not undermine his proposal for a kidney market because most other vendors would not be coerced. Again, this is a dubious sort of argument on the view that I defend: there may be good reason to prohibit sales in order to protect non-autonomous vendors, even if they are a minority. to economic desperation, and more likely to be coerced to sell because they lack other resources of interest to coercers. And decisions that are non-autonomous for these two reasons are also less likely to conduce to the vendor's own welfare. Desperate decisionmakers are less likely to accurately factor in their own long-term welfare, and coerced decision-makers lack the opportunity to factor it in altogether. If this is right, anti-paternalism with respect to kidney sales will favour better off vendors and disfavour the worse off.
The upshot is that the proportion of non-autonomous kidney vendors required for the group soft paternalistic argument to work depends on how important one thinks equality is.
People with egalitarian or prioritarian sympathies may endorse restricting the freedom of a fairly large majority of better off, autonomous vendors in order to protect a minority of worse off, non-autonomous vendors from further worsening their situation. Those who prioritise liberty over equality will require that the proportion of non-autonomous vendors be larger.
Distinguishing between vendors
The argument for any group soft paternalist policy rests on the assumption that, as Miller and
Wertheimer put it, 'it is simply not feasible or cost-effective to adopt different standards for those who are and are not sufficiently autonomous.' 46 If the two different groups can be readily distinguished, the case for restricting everyone's freedom dissolves. The nonautonomous can then be protected by restrictions targeted at them alone, and the autonomous need not have their liberty curtailed. Janet Radcliffe-Richards puts the point nicely:
no one committed to the value of autonomy would rush to institute a prohibition that would limit the freedom of everyone, just on the grounds that some, or even First, kidney sales must be potentially harmful to vendors. Second, a sufficiently large proportion of would-be vendors must be expected not to sell autonomously. Third, distinguishing between autonomous and non-autonomous potential vendors and interfering only with the latter must not be practicable. The greater the potential harm, the larger the proportion of non-autonomous vendors, and the more difficult a discriminating policy is to implement, the stronger the case for prohibition. I have offered some, admittedly inconclusive, reasons to think that each condition will often hold. Hopefully, I have also showed why a more conclusive case cannot be expected on the level of abstraction where my argument proceeds. The conditions involve empirical assumptions -about risks to vendors, their social and economic circumstances and the feasibility of different forms of regulationthat are likely satisfied to different degrees in different contexts. They also involve contestable normative and conceptual claims, particularly concerning the nature of autonomous choice and the importance of equality. Even if anti-paternalists ultimately remain unconvinced, at least I hope that I have given them reason to consider their position more carefully and indicated areas for future debate.
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Finally, whether kidney sales should be legalised ultimately depends not only on what respect for autonomy requires, but also on other considerations, not least the effects of legalisation on the supply of transplantable kidneys. To say that bans on kidney sales are not unjustifiably paternalistic is not to say that they are justified all things considered.
